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Background and Objective: Goal-directed behavior is a central feature of human
functioning. It requires goal appraisal and implicit cost-benefit analyses, i.e., how much
effort to invest in the pursuit of a certain goal, against its value and a confidence
judgment regarding the chance of attainment. Persons with severe mental illness such
as psychosis often struggle with reaching goals. Cognitive deficits, positive symptoms
restricting balanced judgment, and negative symptoms such as anhedonia and avolition
may compromise goal attainment. The objective of this study was to investigate to what
degree symptom severity is related to cognitive abilities, metacognition, and effort-based
decision-making in a visual search task.
Methods: Two studies were conducted: study 1: N = 52 (healthy controls), and study
2: N = 46 (23 patients with psychosis/23 matched healthy controls). Symptoms were
measured by the CAPE-42 (study 1) and the PANSS (study 2). By using a visual search
task, we concomitantly measured (a) accuracy in short-term memory, (b) perceived
accuracy by participants making a capture area or confidence interval, and (c) effort
by measuring how long one searched for the target. Perseverance was assessed in
trials in which the target was omitted and search had to be abandoned.
Results: Higher levels of positive symptoms, and having a diagnosis of psychosis, were
associated with larger errors in memory. Participants adjusted both their capture area
and their search investment to the error of their memory. Perseverance was associated
with negative symptoms in study 1 but not in study 2.
Conclusion: By simultaneously assessing error and confidence in one’s memory, as
well as effort in search, we found that memory was affected by positive, not negative,
symptoms in healthy controls, and was reduced in patients with psychosis. However,
impaired memory did not concur with overconfidence or less effort in search, i.e.,
goal directed behavior was unrelated to symptoms or diagnosis. Metacognition and
motivation were neither affected by cognitive abilities nor by negative symptoms.
Clinically, this could indicate that struggles with goal directed behavior in psychosis may
not solely be dependent on primary illness factors.
Keywords: metacognition, goal-directed behavior, schizophrenia, short-term memory, decision-making
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INTRODUCTION
Motivation and goal-directed behaviors are complex phenomena.
Consider the following: You meet four students and all tell you
that they are motivated to pass an important exam. Student A
is very smart, she knows she is high performing, and she spends
some time but not all day on studying for the exam. Student B is
smart, and she knows she can pass the exam if she studies all day.
Student C is not as smart as students A and B, but she still wants to
pass the exam and she, too, studies all day. Student D is as smart
as student C but thinks of herself as being as smart as student A
and does not spend all day studying for the exam. This example
illustrates the interplay of cognitive ability, knowing about one’s
ability, and effort (here the amount of learning spent) affecting
goal-directed behavior. Without asking about motivation, only
measuring the outcome or the effort, we would draw different
conclusions. Students A and D would appear as not having spent
much effort, hence not being motivated. Students C and D may
appear not motivated as they might not have passed the exam.
We often infer motivation from the intensity, e.g., speed or
vigor, with which a person tries to achieve a goal and how much
effort she invests in a task, respectively. However, this equates
motivation with effort, while effort depends on knowing one’s
abilities and chances of reaching the goal. For physical effort
this is obvious: A well-trained person needs less energy to catch
the last bus into town than an untrained person, but both can
be similarly motivated. A person using crutches may also be
similarly motivated to catch the last bus but knows they cannot
make it and hence is not running to the bus. This knowing of what
one can achieve requires metacognition (Norman et al., 2019).
Goal-directed behavior, which is an operationalization of
motivation (Hebb, 1955; Duffy, 1957), requires knowledge about
one’s abilities (metacognition), and the effort needed for reaching
the goal. The latter can be, for example, how fast (latencies,
vigor) or how hard (perseverance) one tries to reach the goal
(Salamone and Correa, 2012). Conversely, if one overcomes the
costs of effortful actions to achieve a desired outcome (Chong
et al., 2016), the costs will depend on one’s abilities. It is rational
to not spend any effort on a too costly or fruitless task (Pfuhl
et al., 2009), or alternatively, to try solving the task in a cheaper
manner (Pfuhl, 2012; Mækelæ et al., 2018). Thus, to infer about
a person’s motivation, we have to know the relative effort spent.
Only measuring absolute effort spent does not suffice.
Amotivation and effort-related impairments are common
symptoms in many mental disorders, including schizophrenia
(Fervaha et al., 2015) and depression (Clery-Melin et al., 2011).
Both are associated with a lack of goal-directed behavior,
impeding daily functioning (Barch et al., 2014; Bergé et al., 2018).
However, effort-related impairments are sensitive to the tasks
in question (Horan et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2015). Often tasks
used in research or clinical practice do not control for cognitive
abilities and metacognition, which is known to also be affected
in these mental disorders (Moritz et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2017;
Norman et al., 2019). Indeed, if a person is like student D, then it
is metacognition, not effort spending, that is aberrant. Students C
and D need in absolute terms to spend more effort.
To tease apart which factors contribute to motivation and
goal-directed behavior, we developed a foraging task that
simultaneously measures how good a person’s visual short-
term memory is, how good a person thinks their memory
is (metacognition), and, consequently, how much effort they
spend in finding a predefined target. By using a mathematical
model, we can also infer the costs of foraging and thereby
calculate the relative effort spent. We tested this in two studies.
In study 1 we recruited healthy participants from the general
population that varied in the severity of dysphoria and psychotic-
like experiences. We thereby aimed to have a larger variation
in cognitive abilities and metacognitive abilities than found in
a pure student sample. In study 2 we recruited patients with
a diagnosis of schizophrenia and related psychoses, as there is
inconsistency in the literature (Gold et al., 2015; Green et al.,
2015; McCarthy et al., 2016; Culbreth et al., 2018) in whether
they lack effort or not, and whether this is due to cognitive
dysfunctions, aberrant metacognition, or true amotivation, i.e.,
no desire to reach the goal. In both studies we used the same
paradigm to measure concomitantly cognitive ability, here visual
short-term memory, implicit metacognition (Honig et al., 2020),
and effort in a foraging task (Pfuhl et al., 2009, 2013). We first
present the task before we review relevant clinical literature.
The Precision and Motivation Task –
A Simple Foraging Task
In an attempt to disentangle the various components inherent
in tasks involving goal-directed behavior, we developed the
Precision and Motivation Task (PMT). The task is based on a
mathematical model (Pfuhl et al., 2009), trying to quantify the
question of how much effort one should invest in an activity
(effort estimation), and when to abandon it in relation to how
likely it is to find reward relative to the cost of searching (reward
valuation and memory estimation).
To illustrate, imagine a treasure hunt where you hide a small
cache with sweets for a children’s party somewhere in a nearby
park in the morning. At lunch time you check on the cache and
find it again. In the late afternoon you (with the children) go
out to find the cache. Since you are distracted on your way to
the location you have a hard time finding the exact location. You
don’t want to embarrass the children and continue searching but
you also see families with dogs, and after a while consider the
option that the cache got raided and abandon the treasure hunt.
In between the extremes of knowing for sure and having no
idea, there is an optimal limit of investing in the search. As you
forget (memory of the location of the cache becomes less precise),
the optimal search limit first rises, but then it declines steeply.
Furthermore, your investment depends also on the probability
of it being there, and not having been removed by a third party
(here: cache raided by a dog). This probability of a third party
is never zero. However, the closer it is to zero, the longer you
should search irrespective of the precision of your memory. If
the probability of the target being gone is high, you should–as in
the case of having poor memory–not start searching at all (Pfuhl
et al., 2009). This cognitive weighing of pros and cons of investing
effort is an example of effort-based decision making.
In this foraging task the investment in search depends on how
well one thinks one’s memory is, and how likely one thinks that
no third party raided the cache. In our task, we inform about the
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probability of the cache being raided, and measure directly how
well a person thinks she remembers the cache. We refer to how
well one thinks one remembers as meta-cognitive ability in the
remainder of the article.
In sum, this task allows us to measure how precise a person’s
memories for a target actually are (visual short-term memory),
how precise they believe those memories are (meta-cognitive
ability), and how much effort they invest in searching for
the target, respectively (Pfuhl et al., 2013). We also measured
perseverance, latencies, and vigor. Vigor has been found to be
an implicit measure for the subjective utility of the outcome
(Shadmehr et al., 2019). Perseverance is the duration of search
relative to one’s metacognitive ability.
Motivation, Vigor, and Effort-Based
Decision Making in Psychosis and
Schizophrenia
It has previously been thought that motivational deficits in
schizophrenia were linked to the anhedonia and the blunting of
affect seen in negative symptoms (Rømer Thomsen et al., 2015).
However, it appears that in-the-moment hedonic experiences are
in fact intact (Llerena et al., 2012). This has led researchers to
explore other possibilities, now suggesting that individuals with
negative symptoms have deficits in a range of reward-related
processes, making it difficult to translate reward information into
motivated behavior (Blanchard and Cohen, 2006; Whitton et al.,
2015; Barch et al., 2016). This has been proposed as a deficit of
vigor, the speed of activities toward a goal, dependent on the
computation of reward expectation, i.e., subjective goodness of
an option, and effort (Shadmehr et al., 2019).
Others have linked negative and depressive symptoms, both
prevalent in schizophrenia (an der Heiden et al., 2016) to
amotivation (Pelizza and Ferrari, 2009), and accordingly to a lack
of goal-directed behavior (Brown and Pluck, 2000). A range of
studies have found that individuals with psychotic disorders or
schizophrenia have effort-related impairments (Barch et al., 2014;
Whitton et al., 2015) and that there is an association between
the degree of negative symptoms and these impairments (Bergé
et al., 2018). In healthy populations similar findings have been
reported for negative symptom-like phenomena (Stefanis et al.,
2002; Terenzi et al., 2019).
Cognitive Abilities in Psychosis and
Schizophrenia
Research on cognitive dysfunctions in psychosis in general, and
schizophrenia in particular, is abundant, as these have been
considered core features for at least the last century (Mesholam-
Gately et al., 2009). They have been studied in relation to
negative symptoms, which are characterized by a lack of interest
in goal-directed behavior and affective expression (Andreasen
et al., 1995), as well as psychomotor poverty (Liddle and Barnes,
1990), and in relation to positive symptoms (Moritz et al.,
2008), characterized by unwilled mental experiences such as
hallucinations or paranoia. They are known to appear before
psychosis onset (Barragan et al., 2011; Bora and Murray, 2014)
and have also been found in first-degree relatives of persons with
psychosis (Snitz et al., 2006; Montag et al., 2012).
Deficits are most prominent in memory (working memory,
verbal, and visual memory), processing speed, and visuospatial
abilities (Mesholam-Gately et al., 2009). Severity of general
symptom load appears to be related to severity of general
cognitive deficits in some studies (Barder et al., 2013), but
minimally so in others (Dominguez Mde et al., 2009). Negative
symptoms specifically appear to be associated with poorer
memory (both verbal and visual), verbal fluency and executive
functions (O’Leary et al., 2000), and with poorer motor and
information processing speed (Rund et al., 2016), or movement
vigor. However, some researchers have proposed that it might
not be negative symptoms in themselves that drive cognitive
dysfunction–or the other way around–but that this relation is
moderated by psychological factors such as a defeatist belief
(Grant and Beck, 2009) and an underconfidence in one’s abilities
(Szu-Ting Fu et al., 2012). The observed overlap of negative
with depressive symptoms (an der Heiden et al., 2016) supports
this. Both the memory dimension of deficits and negative
symptoms are particularly important for daily life functioning,
and therefore, highly relevant foci of study (Fu et al., 2017). Both
negative symptoms and cognitive deficits are longitudinally more
stable compared to positive symptoms, which are more likely
to wax and wane (Harvey et al., 2006), leading to the widely
held belief that these are the more trait-like core characteristics
of schizophrenia.
In sum, motivation, effort-based decision making, and goal-
directed behavior in psychosis and schizophrenia appear to be
linked through cognitive (working memory, processing speed),
vigor (the reflection of the economic evaluation of cost vs. benefit
as speed toward a goal), and symptom (especially negative)
factors. Several paradigms have been developed to be able to more
objectively measure motivation and effort (Gorissen et al., 2005;
Horan et al., 2015; Reddy et al., 2015; Bergé et al., 2018). These
tasks measure how much effort one is willing to exert across
different reward amounts and reward probability conditions.
They do not measure effort relative to one’s cognitive abilities and
belief in one’s abilities. Hence, analyzing the various components
involved remains a challenge.
In two studies we investigated the role of the various
components in our PMT. Our aim is identifying which
component(s) contributes to effort-based decision-making in
psychosis. In detail:
As hypothesis 1a) we predicted neurocognitive deficits in
participants to be associated with load of symptoms and
symptom-like phenomena. In hypothesis 1b) we predicted
a difference in metacognitive ability among individuals: On
the one hand we expected dysphoric participants to be
underconfident (Szu-Ting Fu et al., 2012) and participants
with psychotic-like experiences to be overconfident about
their memory (Moritz et al., 2015).
In hypothesis 2a) we expected that participants with many
symptoms will search less than needed to find the target.
In hypothesis 2b) we expected reduced speed and vigor
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among participants with predominantly negative symptoms
and symptom-like phenomena and dysphoria compared
to participants scoring predominantly high on positive
symptoms and symptom-like phenomena and to the control
group with no symptoms.
STUDY 1 – INVESTIGATING
GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR ALONG
THE PSYCHOSIS SPECTRUM
The aim of this study was to identify which of the several
psychosis-like phenomena contribute the most to a lack of
motivation and goal-directed behavior in a non-clinical sample.
We aimed to recruit healthy, not at risk, participants with a first-
degree relative diagnosed with a psychotic disorder to increase
the odds that our sample varies in the severity of psychosis-
like symptoms.
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-three individuals with no current or prior history of mental
illness were recruited through social media and on a volunteer
basis. Twelve of the participants had first-degree relatives with
mental illness history, of whom four reported a relative with a
schizophrenia diagnosis and eight with a first-degree relative with
a bipolar diagnosis. The age ranged from 18 to 49 years, with
mean age of 26 (SD = 7.1). Thirty-seven (70%) of the participants
were women. Participants were excluded if they presented a
substance use disorder (except nicotine), clinically significant
psychiatric symptoms, or if they had neurological disorders. One
participant was excluded due to abandoning testing after two
tasks, leaving 52 participants.




We used the Trail Making Test (TMT) A and B (Reitan and
Wolfson, 1985). TMT A yields an indication of psychomotor
speed and visual processing, which is an attention and processing
speed measure, whereas TMT B is an estimate of mental flexibility
and inhibition, central compounds of cognitive control and
executive function. The task was administered and interpreted
as described in Bowie and Harvey (2006). We used the Digit
Symbol Substitution Task (DSST), a test that is sensitive to
psychomotor speed and general speed of information processing.
The score is computed by counting the number of correct
pairings completed in 90 s.
Precision and Motivation Task
We developed an effort-based decision-making paradigm, where
one has to search for a previously seen shape (visual short-term
memory), indicate how well one thinks that one remembers the
shape (implicit metacognitive assessment), and decide to search
for it with the probability of succeeding in finding the shape
signaled (effort-based decision). There are points to be scored
for correct responses. We presented the task as a computer
game with a background story of squirrels hiding nuts and other
squirrels stealing them. The game has four stages.
Stage 1: An abstract shape (the “nut”) is shown for 2 s
(Figure 1A). The participant is instructed to remember the shape.
Stage 2: The participant must indicate where, among 30 similar
shapes arranged continuously on a circle, the previously seen
shape is located. If she does not remember, she can move on by
clicking the “next trial” button. This stage measures the error of
one’s memory as the deviation between the chosen shape and the
target shape, measured in degrees (Figure 1B).
Stage 3: From the indicated location of the shape the
participant draws a capture area (Figure 1C). The participant is
instructed to make the area large enough so that she is sure the
shape is located somewhere inside the capture area (Graf et al.,
2005; Pfuhl et al., 2013; Honig et al., 2020). The size of the capture
area can be considered an implicit measure of confidence. Points
are received depending on the size of the capture area in relation
to one’s error in memory. The maximum score is 10 points in
each trial, with points subtracted if the capture area is made too
large, but no points earned if the capture area is made too small.
The points are presented after each trial (stage 5). Metacognitive
error is calculated as the ratio of the logs of the size of the capture
area and the memory (stage 2). A ratio of 1 indicates perfect
calibration between real and perceived precision of memory.
A ratio larger than 1 indicates underconfidence whereas a ratio
smaller than 1 indicates overconfidence.
Stage 4: The participant searches for the shape after being
presented with information about the probability of finding it,
represented by a mean or a kind squirrel (Figure 1D). The
mean squirrel is hungry and steals the nut in 1 out of 3 cases.
The kind squirrel is less hungry and steals the nut in 1 out
of 6 cases (representing 67 and 83% probability of success or
finding the nut). The participant was informed that the nut will
be found if searched long enough but that search has to be
abandoned if she thinks the nut got stolen. These stolen trials
are referred to as no-target trials and are not signaled. Search
was done by clicking the left mouse key repeatedly. The search
started where the participant indicated she thinks the nut is
located (same as for stage 3) and expanded equally to each side
(Figure 1E). The search ended either when the search radius
reached the location of the nut in all but no-target trials, or
the participant abandoned search by clicking “next trial.” Ten
points were received if the nut was found, otherwise the search
yielded zero points. Hence, in each trial, participants earned
points for their metacognitive ability (stage 3, point amount
variable) and success (10 or 0 points). The search phase represents
goal-directed behavior and has to be seen in relation to the
capture area. Searching less than the indicated capture area means
that one spends less effort than one’s belief or (meta-) memory
indicates. Accordingly, we calculated a perseverance score as
the ratio of logs of search radius in no-target trials and the
size of the capture area. A number larger than 1 means that
participants searched longer than indicated by the capture area
made. Conversely, a score below 1 indicates searching less than
announced by the capture area made.
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FIGURE 1 | Precision and motivation task. (A) Sample phase, here a squiggly shape is shown for 2 s. (B) Retrieval phase, 30 similar shapes are organized in a circle.
The participant indicates the location of the shape looking most alike as the one seen in the sample phase. (C) Confidence phase, participants make a capture area
large enough to be certain that the shape from the sample phase is included in the area. (D) The chances of reward are signaled. The probability of not finding the
“nut” is indicated by the squirrel, either 1/6 or 1/3. (E) Search phase, the participant searches for the “nut,” starting at the indicated location from the retrieval phase.
(A) White line stretches in both directions for each click, indicating the search. When found or abandoned, the program provides visual feedback on the capture area
with red indicating excess area. (F) Points earned for making a well-calibrated capture area (shown in the green rectangle), and points earned for search (shown in
the blue rectangle) are presented. Total earnings are always presented in the bottom, bottom left for capture area and bottom right for search. Apart from the sample
phase, all other phases were self-paced. Abandoning retrieval, confidence judgment, and search was possible by clicking on the “next trial” button (no points
earned).
Stage 5: presented the earned points, i.e., feedback on how
many points participants earned in stage 3 for making a capture
area, where the maximum was 10 points and points less than
0 (negative points) were possible if an excessive large capture
area was made, and in stage 4 where one either received 10
points or no points (Figure 1F). There was no incentive for
abandoning a trial.
The PMT had 45 trials, 30 trials with 1/6 probability of the
nut being stolen, 15 trials with 1/3 probability of the nut being
stolen. In stolen (no target) trials one sees the maximal effort
a participant is willing to exert for a reward. The task was
programmed in Labview.
The task measured precision in visual short-term memory,
perceived precision, hit rate, absolute and relative search effort,
latencies and vigor by which participants searched.
CAPE-42
To measure subclinical symptoms, the participants completed
the Norwegian version of the Community Assessment of Psychic
Experiences (CAPE-42) (Stefanis et al., 2002) questionnaire.
The CAPE-42 was developed to measure the lifetime prevalence
of psychotic experiences in the general population. The
CAPE has three subscales: positive (CAPE-P), negative
(CAPE-N) and depressive (CAPE-D). The questionnaire
was implemented in Qualtrics.
Internal consistency for the CAPE-42 total score (α = 0.94),
as well as for the positive symptom subscale (α = 0.84), the
negative symptom subscale (α = 0.90), and the depressive
symptom subscale (α = 0.87), were high. CAPE negative and
CAPE depressive subscale correlated highly, ρ = 0.823, p < 0.001.
Because of this correlation and the significant conceptual overlap
(an der Heiden et al., 2016), and to maximize the probability
of score variability in a healthy population, we created a new
subscale CAPE-ND being the sum of those two subscales.
Procedure
Participants read and signed the consent form and completed
a survey asking about education and employment, alcohol
habits, medication and substance use habits, mental health, and
neurological disorders. Thereafter they performed the TMT A
and B and the DSST. These tests were done with pen and paper
and a stopwatch. Next, we demonstrated the PMT introducing
the stages and point structure step-wise in six demonstration
trials. The task took approximately 22 min to complete. Lastly,
participants answered the CAPE-42.
Ethics
The project was approved by the Regional Committee for
Medical and Health Research Ethics Norway, Region West
(2011/1198/REK Vest).
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Statistical Analyses
We used multiple regression for TMT A, TMT B, DSST with
CAPE-P, CAPE-ND, and age as predictors. The results do not
change when including education (Tombaugh, 2004).
For the PMT we calculated the average latency to start a
trial and vigor (speed at which the search clicks were made).
Average error in memory was the absolute error of memory
in all 45 trials. Similarly, the average size of the capture area
was based on all trials where a participant made a capture area.
Metacognitive error was the relative size of the capture area to
one’s error in memory.
Search radius was calculated separately for trials with a high
or low probability of finding the target, and for trials where
the target could be found, and where it could not be found.
In trials where the shape could not be found we calculated the
perseverance score, which expressed search investment relative
to perceived error. Hits are all trials where the search was long
enough to include the target shape, and a high hit rate suggested
a decision criterion based on low effort sensitivity.
Finally, we calculated the costs of searching by using the 1D
approach described in Pfuhl et al. (2009). The cost function
depends on one’s perceived error and search as well as the
probability of success. Details of the mathematical derivation
and code to evaluate the costs of searching can be found here:
https://osf.io/9bfxt/.
We used multiple regression for the indices of the PMT with
the CAPE-P, CAPE-ND, and age as predictors. Data was analyzed
in R and JASP (JASP Team, 2020).
Results
None of the participants had psychiatric symptoms indicative
of mental disorder; however, 13 participants reported feeling
depressed or dysphoric at a sub-clinical level.
Hypothesis 1a predicted that neurocognition as measured by
the TMT A and B, the DSST and error in the visual short-term
memory task would be impaired in participants with high CAPE-
42 scores. Table 1 provides the descriptives for those four tests, as
well as for the symptom severity in this sample.
There was no significant relationship between TMT A and
CAPE-P (β = 0.18, t = 1.07, p = 0.29) or CAPE-ND (β = −0.07,
t = −0.42, p = 0.68), but there was a significant relationship of
age and TMT A (β = 0.50, t = 3.83, p < 0.001), i.e., younger
TABLE 1 | Symptom severity and neurocognitive task performance (N = 52) in
study 1.
M(SD) Minimum Maximum
CAPE-P 25.62 (4.9) 20.00 41.00
CAPE-ND 42.64 (11.1) 26.00 69.00
TMT-A 24.74 (5.9) 14.37 38.18
TMT-B 59.16 (16.6) 30.49 100.85
DSST 57.48 (7.9) 37.00 73.00
Error in PMT 18.29 (7.3) 7.23 40.47
CAPE-P, positive symptom scale from the CAPE-42. CAPE-ND,
negative/depressive symptom scale. TMT A and TMT B is measured in
seconds, DSST is measured as number of correct symbols. Error in PMT is
measured in degrees. Means (M; with standard deviations SD).
people were faster. There was a significant relationship of TMT
B performance with lower levels of CAPE-P (β = 0.39, t = 2.09,
p = 0.042), but not with CAPE-ND (β = −0.22, t = −1.23,
p = 0.22) or age (β = 0.13, t = 0.91, p = 0.37).
There was a significant negative relationship between CAPE-P
and completed pairings in DSST (β = −0.53, t = −3.29, p = 0.002)
and between age and DSST (β = −0.39, t = −3.10, p = 0.003),
i.e., more positive symptoms and older age were associated with
fewer completed pairings. There was no significant relationship
between DSST and CAPE-ND (β = 0.08, t = 0.52, p = 0.60).
The error in memory was statistically significantly associated
with CAPE-P (β = 0.672, t = 4.406, p < 0.001), i.e., the
more positive symptoms, the poorer visual short-term memory.
There was no significant relationship between visual short-term
memory and CAPE-ND (β = −0.227, t = −1.517, p = 0.136) or
age (β = 0.141, t = 1.141, p = 0.259).
Hypothesis 1b predicted aberrant metacognition in
participants scoring high on symptoms, i.e., participants
reporting positive symptom-like experiences would be
overconfident whereas participants high on depression/
negative symptoms would be underconfident.
Metacognitive Error
On average participants were well calibrated, i.e., the size of
the capture area corresponded well to their error, M = 1.037,
SD = 0.122. The predictors explained only 11.4% of the variance,
F = 2.053, p = 0.119. The mean hit rate, searching long enough
to find the target, was 0.66 (SD = 0.11), ranging from 0.42
to 0.96. The predictors explained only 11% of the variance,
F = 1.977, p = 0.13.
Thus, we found that symptom severity and age did not
relate to how well people assess their memory to be; there was
no clear indication of over- or underconfidence, i.e., aberrant
metacognition, in participants with psychotic-like experiences or
those with dysphoria.
Hypothesis 2a predicted that goal-directed behavior would
be diminished in people scoring high on negative or depressive
symptoms, i.e., that they would search less than indicated
by the capture area. Since the search radius depends on
how well a person thinks she remembers the shape, we
used the perseverance score. A score larger than 1 indicates
searching beyond the capture area made. In the high probability
condition the perseverance score was 1.24 (SD = 0.166),
and in the low probability condition the perseverance score
was 1.191 (SD = 0.168), indicating that participants searched
beyond the capture area made in both the high and the
low probability conditions. One sample t-test confirmed that
the search exceeded the capture area made [high probability
condition: t(51) = 10.4, p < 0.001, d = 1.443; low probability
condition: t(51) = 8.21, p < 0.001, d = 1.138]. Perseverance
was lower in the low probability condition, t(51) = 2.968,
p = 0.005, d = 0.412 than in the high probability condition.
Next, we performed stepwise multiple regressions with positive
and negative/depressive symptom scores and age as predictors.
In the high probability condition, the remaining predictor was
the CAPE-P, β = −0.305, t = −2.264, p = 0.028, indicating
less perseverance associated with higher positive symptom
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scores. In contrast, for the low probability condition, only the
CAPE-ND remained, β = −0.324, t = −2.417, p = 0.019,
indicating less perseverance for higher negative/depressive
symptoms. Since CAPE-P and CAPE-ND correlated highly
(ρ = 0.616, p < 0.001), general symptom severity (total
CAPE-42 score) related to search investment, i.e., the more
symptoms a participant reported, the less was their relative search
investment.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that individuals with many negative
or depressive symptoms show longer latencies and lower vigor.
The average latency to start a trial was 2.76 s (SD = 1.14), ranging
from 1.18 to 6.26. The average vigor in high probability trials was
0.25 (SD = 0.09), ranging from 0.15 to 0.64. In the low probability
trials the mean vigor was 0.26 (SD = 0.07), ranging from 0.16 to
0.59. That is on average a participant made four clicks per second.
There was no relationship between latency, vigor, and symptom
severity or age, all p > 0.05.
Finally, we calculated the costs of searching and found that
it did not relate to symptom severity or age, p > 0.4. Figure 2
summarizes the relationship between the CAPE-42 subscores
and error in memory, perceived error in memory, and relative
investment in search (perseverance).
STUDY 2 – ASSESSING
GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR IN
PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA OR
RELATED PSYCHOSIS
Study 1 recruited participants along the psychosis continuum.
Cognitive abilities were lower among those with more symptoms,
and symptom severity was associated with diminished effort
spent, despite similar costs.
We therefore predicted that: H1a: Patients perform worse on
the neurocognitive tests compared to matched controls. H1b:
Patients have an aberrant meta-cognitive ability compared to
healthy controls. H2a: Goal-directed behavior is reduced, i.e.,
search is less than indicated by the capture area, in patients
compared to controls, and is associated with negative symptoms.
H2b: Latency and vigor is reduced in patients compared to
controls, and is associated with negative symptoms.
PARTICIPANTS
Study participants (N = 23) for the clinical group were recruited
from the on-going TIPS 2 (early Treatment and Intervention in
Psychosis, start in 2002) study, and invited to partake in this
sub-study by one of the research clinical team members, which
consists of highly trained psychiatric nurses. Recruitment was
conducted between 2015 and 2019, and assessments consisted
of the standard TIPS protocol described elsewhere (Melle et al.,
2004), with additional assessments as described above. The main
inclusion criteria, described in detail elsewhere, were having
a first episode of non-affective or affective mood incongruent,
non-organic psychosis, and age between 15 and 65 years. Main
exclusion criteria were suffering from neurological disorder,
primary substance use disorder, or IQ below 70. The patients
agreed to baseline assessment, and follow-up after 3 months and
1, 2, and 5 years. Mean duration since inclusion and baseline
assessment was 4 years (minimum: 1 year, maximum: 5 years).
We recruited 23 age and gender matched participants as healthy
controls. One recruited participant had a first-degree relative
with psychosis and was excluded. We replaced this participant
with one healthy control recruited in study 1. Inclusion criteria
for healthy controls were no first-degree relative with a mental
health diagnosis, no substance use disorder (except nicotine), no
clinically significant psychiatric symptoms, and no neurological
disorders. All participants gave informed written consent.
Materials
We used the same neurocognitive tests and the same PMT
as in study 1. Symptoms were assessed by using the Positive
and Negative Syndromes in Schizophrenia interview (PANSS)
(Kay et al., 1987). The interview, the neurocognitive tests,
and the computer task were conducted by three psychologists,
under supervision from author WH. The TIPS team holds
regular reliability trainings to avoid drift, and previous reliability
assessments have proven good reliability (Hegelstad et al., 2012).
Patients only received the PANSS.
Procedure
Patients were first interviewed with the PANSS before starting
the behavioral tasks. Matched control participants were not
interviewed, however, demographics were recorded (age, gender,
education, medication, and handedness).
Ethics
This study was approved by the Regional Committee for
Medical and Health Research Ethics Norway, Region West
(2011/1198/REK Vest).
Statistical Analyses
The indices are similarly calculated as in study 1. Group
comparisons are done with t-tests, test of equality of variances
done with Levene’s test, and effect of symptom severity on
outcomes assessed with regression analysis.
Results
Sample characteristics of study 2 are summarized in Table 2.
Hypothesis 1a was confirmed: The patient group was
significantly slower on the TMT A and TMT B, and they
completed fewer pairings in the DSST and had larger errors in
memory. Patients needed on average 30.83 s (SD = 8.7) on the
TMT A, and 98.1 s (SD = 45.1) on the TMT B, whereas controls
needed 23.24 s (SD = 4.8) and 56.88 s (SD = 14.45), respectively.
Patients solved on average 55.4 (SD = 15.1) pairings, and controls
solved on average 65.35 (SD = 16.3) on the DSST. Patients had
larger errors of their visual short-term memory in the PMT. The
mean deviation in degrees for patients was 27.5 (SD = 11.18),
and for controls 22.12 (SD = 10.01). Since we had directional
predictions we used one-sided Welch’s t-test, and all comparisons
were statistically significant (Table 3). There was a significant
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FIGURE 2 | Association of symptom severity with error in memory (deviation), metacognitive error, and investment in search in study 1. Numbers represent
Pearson’s correlation coefficients, and asterisks indicate a p-value below 0.05. The more positive symptoms the more errors in memory (Pearson’s r = 0.5,
p < 0.001) and also the more negative/depressive symptoms (r = –0.65, p < 0.001). The more negative/depressive symptoms a participant had, the less the person
invested in searching relative to the belief in their memory (r = –0.32 p = 0.02). General symptom severity (CAPE-P and CAPE-ND) related to relative effort in both
probability conditions (not shown). Perseverance (effort) in the high and low probability condition were highly correlated (r = 0.75, p < 0.001). Finally, the worse the
memory (larger PMT error) the more overconfident participants were (r = –0.74, p < 0.001).
TABLE 2 | Sample characteristics study 2.
Patients (n = 23) HC (n = 23)
N (%) N (%)
Gender, female 8 (34.7) 7 (30.4)
Gender, male 15 (65.3) 16 (69.6)
Diagnosis
Schizophrenia spectrum 16 (69.6) n/a
Affective psychosis 1 (4.3) n/a
Other psychosis1 6 (26.1) n/a
M (SD) Md (r) M (SD) Md (r)
Age 27.1 (8.7) 24 (16–48) 26.0 (9.9) 23 (15–52)
Years of education after
secondary school total score
2.7 (2.8) 3 (0–7) 4.4 (2.8) 4 (2–11)
PANSS subscale
Positive2 11.9 (4.7) 12 (7–26) n/a n/a
Negative2 13.5 (6.7) 11 (7–29) n/a n/a
General3 25.5 (8.9) 24 (16–54) n/a n/a
DDD antipsychotic 0.72 (0.77) 0.66 (0–2.7) n/a n/a
Means (M; with standard deviations SD) and medians (Md; with range r) are
displayed. 1Delusional disorder, Psychosis NOS. 2Maximum score 63. 3Maximum
score 112. DDD, defined daily dosis.
larger variation in the patient group for the TMT A (F = 9.13,
p = 0.004) and TMT B (F = 9.909, p = 0.003) but not for the DSST
or error in memory.
TABLE 3 | Independent Samples Welch’s T-Test, one-sided testing.
t df p Cohen’s d
TMT A −3.658 34.288 <0.001 −1.079
TMT B −4.177 26.479 <0.001 −1.232
DSST 2.150 43.776 0.019 0.634
PMT error −1.717 43.465 0.047 −0.506
Within the patient group we performed step-wise regressions
with the three subscales of the PANSS and age as predictors. We
found that negative symptoms were associated with lower DSST
performance, β = −0.473, t = −2.462, p = 0.023. For TMT scores
and error in memory, neither age nor symptom severity were
statistically significant predictors.
Hypothesis 1b was not confirmed; there was no difference
in meta-cognition (e.g., overconfidence in the patient group),
t(44) = 1.019, p = 0.157, d = 0.301. Both groups had a ratio
slightly smaller than 1, HC group: M = 0.972, SD = 0.128,
SCZ group: M = 0.937, SD = 0.106. Metacognitive error
was not related to PANSS scores in the patient sample,
all p-values > 0.2.
The mean hit rate was marginally smaller in the SCZ group
than the HC group with a medium effect size, t(44) = 1.552,
p = 0.064, d = 0.458, where patients found on average
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56% (SD = 12%) of the targets whereas controls found
61% (SD = 13%).
Hypothesis 2a was not confirmed. Goal-directed behavior was
similar in both groups. We noted, however, that one patient
never started searching. The perseverance score was above 1
for both groups and in both conditions, all four p < 0.001.
Mixed ANOVA yielded less search in the low compared to
the high probability condition, F(1,43) = 6.653, p = 0.013,
η2 = 0.015, but no group difference, F < 1, or interaction,
F < 1. Thus, patients and controls alike searched beyond
the capture area made and invested more in trials with a
higher chance to succeed. We performed a step-wise regression
within the patient group. In the high probability condition,
age was a statistically significant predictor, p = 0.049, but
symptom severity did not predict perseverance in high or low
probability trials. Finally, we assessed the costs of searching.
The two groups had similar search costs, and within the SCZ
group search costs did not relate to symptom scores or age,
all p > 0.1. As can be seen in Figure 3, both groups are
similar in their error in memory, capture area made, and
search performed.
Hypothesis 2b was partly confirmed. There were no
group differences for latencies or vigor, all ps > 0.1.
Within the patient group, step-wise regressions with
symptom scores and age as predictors revealed that larger
vigor (fewer clicks per minute) was related to higher
PANSS general scores in the high probability condition,
β = 0.487, t = 2.553, p = 0.019, but failed to reach
statistical significance in the low probability condition
(pair-wise: r = 0.377).
Goal-Directed Behavior and
Neurocognitive Abilities
After pooling the data from both studies, we explored whether
error in memory, metacognitive error, or investment in search
and cost of searching are related to the speed in the trail
making tasks and the DSST. We also assessed whether
perseverance was associated with the error in memory. We
used Bonferroni correction (eight tests) and treat p < 0.006 as
statistically significant.
We found a significant association between speed on the TMT
B and error in one’s memory, β = 0.334, t = 2.978, p = 0.004.
TMT-A or DSST were not significant, p > 0.2. Metacognitive
error, on the other hand, was neither related to TMT-A, TMT-B,
nor DSST. These predictors only explained 6.5% of the variance,
F = 2.165, p = 0.097. Goal-directed behavior, as measured with
the perseverance score, was not predicted by TMT-A, TMT-B,
or DSST, p > 0.1. Regarding motor speed, latency to start was
positively related with TMT-B, β = 0.258, t = 2.264, p = 0.026,
but not with TMT-A or DSST, p > 0.2. Vigor was not predicted
by TMT-A, TMT-B, or DSST, p > 0.1. Costs of searching were
not related to any of the neurocognitive test scores, p > 0.1.
Finally, there was also no significant association between the
perseverance scores (low and high probability condition) and
error in memory, p > 0.2.
FIGURE 3 | Short-term memory performance expressed as errors in degrees, capture area made (proxy for implicit confidence judgment), and search radii among
n = 23 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or related psychosis (top row) and n = 23 matched healthy controls. The variances between the groups did
statistically significantly differ for the capture area made (Levene’s test, p = 0.003) but note that we use the capture area relative to error in memory (metacognitive
ability) and relative to the search radius in no-target trials (perseverance).
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DISCUSSION
The hypotheses tested in this study were first, that neurocognition
be associated with levels of clinical and subclinical symptoms,
and second, that positive symptoms be associated with over- and
negative/depressive symptoms with underconfidence regarding
memory; that third, symptom levels be associated with search
effort, and finally, that negative sub-clinical and clinical
symptoms be associated with reduced speed and vigor on
an experimental task. Neurocognitive deficits were related
to psychotic-like experiences and psychosis. Metacognition,
expressed as under- or overconfidence, however, was well
calibrated irrespective of diagnosis or symptom severity. Search
effort and perseverance was more diminished the more
psychotic-like experiences one had (study 1) and vigor was more
diminished the more general symptoms a patient had (study 2).
Goal-directed behavior as measured by the outcome (hit rate)
was reduced in patients, but this finding was not statistically
significant when compared to healthy controls.
In study 1 we found that neurocognitive deficits, both in the
DSST and error in visual short-term memory, were related to
positive, and not negative, symptom-like experiences. Similarly,
Rossler et al. (2015) found that processing speed in the DSST
was related to anomalous perception in healthy adults. Abu-Akel
et al. (2016), though, found that participants with predominantly
negative and few positive symptoms were less accurate in a
visual-spatial working memory task. This difference might be
due to our sample consisting of participants that had either
very few symptoms (low CAPE-42 score) or had both many
negative/depressive symptoms and positive-like experiences.
In study 2, testing participants with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, we replicated previous findings that patients
have slower psychomotor speed and visual processing, i.e., have
more problems with interference and mental flexibility and also
poorer visual short-term memory (Schaefer et al., 2013). The
finding that poorer memory performance was associated with
lower scores on TMT-B might be explained by the executive
component of both tests, in so far that both place a load on
working memory and manipulation of “on-line” information.
We found some indication that negative symptoms affect
performance in the DSST; however, our sample was small and as
for study 1, patients often had either few symptoms or both many
negative/depressive and positive symptoms. We can therefore
not conclude whether positive or negative symptoms contribute
more to neurocognitive deficits.
Regarding meta-cognition, here confidence in one’s own
memory, we used a non-verbal assessment of metacognition
by asking participants to draw a capture area just large
enough that it includes the target. This, in our opinion,
yielded a more implicit and observable measure compared
to that obtained by inquiring about confidence using rating
scales. However, this implicit assessment of confidence yielded
neither a group difference nor was it related to symptom-like
experiences. Indeed, overconfidence seems not to be linked to
delusional symptoms (Balzan, 2016). Furthermore, in a motoric-
perceptual task Knoblich et al. (2004) found intact automatic
self-correction, but a failure to report mismatches in patients. In
line with our findings, this suggests that implicit metacognition is
intact in psychosis.
Further, we found no overall association between hit rate
and symptoms in study 1. In study 2 there was a small to
medium effect size with patients having a lower hit rate than
controls. Regarding search in those trials where the target could
not be found, we found that symptom load was associated
with perseverance among healthy participants in study 1, but
not in patients. This could perhaps be explained by symptoms
above a clinical threshold level no longer exerting marginally
higher effects on perseverance. Furthermore, both participants
in study 1 and patients in study 2 with higher symptom
severity searched either less in relative terms (study 1) or less
vigorously (study 2). In study 1, higher symptom levels predicted
lower perseverance overall. For positive symptoms, this was
more true for the high, and for negative symptoms, more true
for the low probability condition, which might be a spurious
effect or reflect subjective beliefs in succeeding. One possible
explanation might be found in the underconfidence associated
with negative/depressive symptoms: No matter the probability,
perseverance is lower, while for positive symptoms, perseverance
is not compromised by low probability. However, with high
probability, search perseverance in positive symptoms might
be influenced by hasty decision making, and consequently, less
reflection on the actual probability of attaining the goal (Moritz
et al., 2017). Still, we caution these results, as the effects are small.
Importantly, despite reduced memory, the costs of searching
were not different. The cost function takes into account the belief
and the actual search investment. It is not a metabolic cost or
based on motor behavior solely. Indeed, due to their less precise
memory, patients did search longer and had to make more clicks
to reach the goal, respectively.
Our results indicate that patients did value reward equally
to healthy controls, as we found no reduced vigor or latency
(Shadmehr et al., 2019) among the groups. Vigor was shown
to reflect the subjective value, not the salience of the outcome.
Such a similar subjective evaluation of the outcome agrees
with previous research that found intact hedonic experiences
(Llerena et al., 2012).
Our results did not support the hypothesized association
of reduced effort with negative symptoms of psychosis, and
highlight prior inconsistencies in this literature (Gold et al., 2015;
McCarthy et al., 2016). This inconsistency may in part be due
to the fact that reduced effort is just one of many components
that can affect the expression of negative symptoms. Negative
symptom expression depends on a range of psychological,
behavioral, motor, cognitive, and biological phenomena. Passivity
(due to having assumed a patient-role, for instance) resulting in
reduced overall effort, or avolition, are only some of them. To
illustrate, in the TIPS early detection mental health system it
has previously been shown that early intervention and treatment
is associated with less severe negative symptoms over the first
5 years of follow-up and superior vocational outcomes after
10 years compared to control areas. This may possibly be linked
to intact effort in general, and one can speculate that relatively
low levels of negative symptoms also may explain the lack of
difference between patients and controls on the effort measure
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of the task in this study where patients come from the TIPS
center. Indeed, in our study presented here, in spite of no
association with negative symptoms specifically, patients had
significantly slower speeds on the TMT tasks and DSST compared
to healthy controls. Follow-up analyses using data from both
studies indicated that speed measured by TMT B predicted
latency to start search. TMT B also has an executive component,
which may also explain this latency, as well as worse performance
in the TMT-B correlated with worse performance in the PMT.
Regarding the analogy with the students, our findings suggest
that participants with psychotic-like experiences and patients
with a schizophrenia or other diagnosis of psychosis are on
average more like student C. That is, our results suggest that
neither neurocognitive deficits nor symptom patterns alone
predicted metacognition or goal-directed behavior. Possible
explanations could be that our task assessed metacognition
implicitly and was not an obvious effort task. Finally, our data
indicate that the relations between symptoms, cognition and
meta-cognition are complex and deserving of further study, as the
fact remains that many persons struggling with these symptoms
do face difficulties investing effort in day-to-day tasks.
LIMITATIONS
The two studies had small sample sizes but still replicated the
neurocognitive deficits. Our sample size provided not enough
power to detect subtle motivational differences or find subgroups
of patients with aberrant motivation. Further, one cannot directly
compare symptom-like experiences from the CAPE-42 to PANSS
symptoms. However, this could not be avoided since most
healthy controls will score below clinical threshold on the PANSS;
rendering this instrument not useful in a healthy population.
Future studies should use the CAPE-42 also in patients.
CONCLUSION
By concomitantly measuring cognitive ability, subjective
estimation of cognitive ability, and effort we found similar
goal-directed behavior irrespective of symptom severity among
persons with psychotic-like experiences and participants
diagnosed with psychosis. Implicit metacognition was
preserved in psychosis.
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